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Abstract: Ruchkin et al. use brain-activity data from healthy subjects to
assess the physiological validity of a cognitive working memory model and
to propose modifications. The conclusions drawn from this data are inter-
esting and plausible, but they have limitations. Much of what is known
about the neural mechanisms of working memory comes from single neu-
ron recordings in animals, and it is currently not fully understood how
these translate to scalp recordings of EEG.
In this commentary, I outline four types of physiological limita-
tions to what can be concluded from the existing brain-activity
data, such as that used by Ruchkin et al.
First, our current knowledge about the neural underpinnings of
scalp-recorded EEG signals is not enough to conclude that a
neural phenomenon does not exist. Is it legitimate to rule out the
existence of specialized short-term memory buffers because their
signatures are not evident to us in the EEG phenomena we select?
This is especially difficult to judge, as we do not yet have a suffi-
cient understanding of the basic neural mechanisms that underlie
cognitive concepts such as “representation” and the “activation”
thereof, let alone their reflections in the scalp EEG. Ruchkin et
al. suggest that activations of semantic representations, for exam-
ple, might be deducted from modulations of the N400 com-
ponent. But it is as yet unclear whether the neurophysiological 
indices of these activations are DC-shifts. Stimulus-specific per-
sistent neural activity as a neural mechanism underlying working
memory was discovered thirty years ago, and it is neural firing that
is hypothesized to be sustained by synaptic reverberation (Wang
2001). Oscillations of local field potentials associated with such re-
verberations might give rise to DC-shifts (Caspers et al. 1987), but
they might be more directly visualized as EEG oscillations. The
extent to which neural firing itself is visible in the scalp-recorded
EEG is probably very limited (Logothetis et al. 2001). Ruchkin et
al. acknowledge the importance of neural oscillations, but they
limit their use to assessing interareal coupling and prefer DC-
shifts as an index of intra-areal processing. Why not treat oscilla-
tions as an index of intra-areal processing too? It is quite reason-
able to assume that certain types of neural oscillations do not
covary with slow neural changes, such as DC-shifts, and can reveal
neural processes that otherwise remain undetected (Düzel et al.
2003).
Second, one element of physiological working memory models
in animals is the robustness of delay activity to distracters (Miller
et al. 1996). For example, the Miller et al. study showed persistent
stimulus-specific neural firing in inferotemporal cortex as well as
prefrontal cortex (PFC), but only the prefrontal activity was ro-
bust to distracters in the delay or retention interval. This finding
suggests that PFC neurons can maintain stimulus-selective delay
activity even when delay activity in inferotemporal regions is dis-
rupted by intervening distracters, which in turn might suggest that
stimulus-selective delay activity in PFC does not require delay ac-
tivity in temporal or posterior brain regions (Goldman-Rakic
1995; Wang 2001). Currently we cannot tell if the DC-shifts
recorded by Ruchkin et al. would also show robustness to dis-
tracters.
Third, animal studies suggest that prefrontal neurons code in-
formation in working memory that is more than a “pointer” to pos-
terior stimulus-specific delay activity. My understanding of how
Ruchkin et al. view “pointers” is that these do not store stimulus-
selective information. Rather, they index where stimulus-selective
information is stored. However, there is evidence that prefrontal
neurons indeed store stimulus-selective information and that,
contrary to what Ruchkin et al. assume, the firing patterns of pre-
frontal and parietal neurons could be compatible with duplication
of information in both regions. A direct comparison of prefrontal
and parietal delay activity in nonhuman primates in a spatial work-
ing memory task has shown that neurons in both cortical areas ex-
hibit very similar sustained activity during the delay period, with
nearly identical spatial tuning (Chafee & Goldman-Rakic 1998).
This finding means that different prefrontal neurons have differ-
ent spatial selectivity in the delay period and hence can code stim-
ulus-specific information to an extent that is likely to go beyond
being a mere pointer to other representations.
Fourth and finally, brain-activity data in healthy subjects cannot
identify brain processes that are critical for a given cognitive func-
tion. Are the posterior DC-shifts that Ruchkin et al. have related
to the maintenance of stimulus-specific information, epiphenom-
enal, or do they reflect critical processes for working memory?
From Ruchkin et al.’s model this question will be difficult to test,
because the model suggests that delayed maintenance of stimu-
lus-specific information is accomplished in those brain regions
that initially process the task-relevant aspects of the stimulus. A
permanent lesion in such brain regions would impair stimulus pro-
cessing even before any maintenance operation could start. What
is necessary to answer this question, are “dynamic” lesions, which
cause impairment selectively and transiently during maintenance.
One way to achieve such dynamic lesions in humans would be by
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Düzel et al. 1996) ap-
plied during the retention interval over the areas where the pos-
terior DC-shifts occurred in the Ruchkin et al. study. Two recent
TMS studies are relevant in this respect. Both of them show that
TMS over posterior neocortex disrupts working memory, but only
if it is applied early, close in time to stimulus processing, and not
later in the retention interval (Harris et al. 2002; Oliveri et al.
2001). One study shows that frontal TMS disrupts working mem-
ory only when applied later in the retention interval (Oliveri et al.
2001). These results are compatible with frontal areas acting as
working memory stores and posterior areas acting as initial proces-
sors rather than regions of activated representations.
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